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Are Capabilities Compatible with Political Liberalism?  
A Third Way1 
Introduction 
It is striking that the leading proponents of the capabilities approach – Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum – each see their distinctive approach as compatible with John Rawls’s political 
liberalism and not as an alternative to it.2 Interestingly, both Sen and Nussbaum each see the 
compatibility of capabilities with political liberalism in very different ways. While Sen argues 
that his view of capabilities are best incorporated within Rawls’s primary goods, Nussbaum 
claims that her different view of capabilities are better understood as forming part of an 
overlapping consensus.  
 This article considers Rawls’s political liberalism and these different views on 
capabilities claim to locate themselves as a part of political liberalism in very different ways. It is 
argued that neither of these two models is successful and, instead, a new third option is more 
promising that lies between them. My claim is that Nussbaum’s approach fits better with 
political liberalism, but only in the place that Sen locates for his own approach. Sen and 
Nussbaum are correct to highlight the compatible of the capabilities approach with political 
liberalism, but not about how or where either find these two compatible. Instead, uniting 
capabilities and political liberalism is only possible through this new, third way which Rawls and 
they have overlooked. 
 
1 This essay is written in British spelling and grammar (spelling color as ‘colour’ and using single quotes instead of 
double  quotations). 
2 While Amartya Sen speaks of his capability approach and Nussbaum of her capabilities approach, I will use 
‘capabilities approach’ to capture them both unless otherwise noted. 
The structure of my argument is as follows. I begin by describing Rawls’s political 
liberalism before proceeding to discuss how Sen believed his capability approach is compatible 
with it. I then explain Nussbaum’s arguments about how her approach is compatible with 
Rawls’s political liberalism. The final section critically examines their claims and argues for a 
new third way bringing together elements from each showing why this different view is more 
compelling and overcomes objections that Rawls has about the relationship between political 
liberalism and capabilities. 
 
Political liberalism 
John Rawls came to believe that his A Theory of Justice suffered from a ‘serious problem’ 
concerning political stability.3 He recognized that citizens are deeply divided by reasonable and 
potentially incompatible religious, philosophical or moral comprehensive doctrines.4 This ‘fact 
of reasonable pluralism’ about the ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ that citizens have is 
neither exceptional nor rare, but an inescapable and ineliminable fact about democratic 
societies.5 We cannot wish our reasonable differences away. 
 Reasonable pluralism presents a potential threat to political stability because if citizens 
are to be free and equal – as Rawls presupposes – their reasonable disagreement about 
preferences for different and opposing comprehensive doctrines can undermine political stability 
 
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, paperback (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): xviii, see xxvii, 3-4. 
4 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001): 
193 and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13, 168. Rawls’s political liberalism rejects our taking account of unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. I will use ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ and ‘comprehensive doctrines’ 
interchangeably. 
5 See John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999): 131; Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 3-4, 33-34, 36, 40, 84 and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 24-25n227, 63-64, 129, 
140, 144, 147-48, 172. 
over time. This creates a problem for how political stability may be possible without denying the 
equality of citizens. Rawls formulates the challenge like this: ‘How is it possible that deeply 
opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the 
political conception of a constitutional regime? What is the structure and content of a political 
conception that can gain the support of such an overlapping consensus?’6 
 For Rawls, disagreement about comprehensive doctrines matters. The public can be 
divided about whether their political community should support policies like capital punishment 
or criminalizing euthanasia without exception from the comprehensive doctrines they endorse.7 
Rawls’s political liberalism respect the equality of citizens by forbidding our prioritizing any one 
comprehensive doctrine over others. Otherwise, the doctrines held by some citizens would have 
a privileged political status above the doctrines held by others – and their equality would be 
respected. This creates the need to find some way to strike this delicate and potentially complex 
balance. 
 Rawls argues that it is a fact that different citizens will endorse a range of different 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This fact of reasonable pluralism poses a threat to political 
stability over time requires a solution – otherwise, political stability over time will be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. Rawls argues that citizens must have a way to determine 
political judgements acceptable to all while treating all reasonable comprehensive doctrines on 
an equal footing to respect the equality of citizens. He says: 
 
 
6 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xx, see 47. 
7 For example, on capital punishment see [anonymized]. 
Thus I believe that a democratic society is not and cannot be a community, where by a 
community I mean a body of persons united in affirming the same comprehensive, or 
partially comprehensive, doctrine the fact of reasonable pluralism which characterizes a 
society with free institutions makes this impossible.8 
 
So disagreement over comprehensive doctrines is not to be addressed by privileging one over 
others or by aiming to have all citizens affirm doctrine. We must find some other way to navigate 
reasonable pluralism. 
 Rawls’s solution is to defend the idea of an overlapping consensus.9 This consensus is a 
common platform that all citizens can accept no matter which comprehensive doctrine they 
endorse. The consensus is conceived as a ‘political conception of justice’.10 For Rawls, the threat 
to political stability posed by reasonable pluralism is ‘a problem of political justice, not a 
problem about the highest good’ and so requires a ‘political’ solution.11 
 An overlapping consensus is a shared political conception of justice that citizens can 
reasonable accept irrespective of which comprehensive doctrine they endorse. Rawls says that 
‘political liberalism looks for a political conception of justice that we hope can gain the support 
of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines’.12 
 
8 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 3. 
9 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 32-38 and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 133-72. See Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: 
Routledge, 2007): 366-71; Sebastiano Maffetone, Rawls: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2010): 261-74 and T. 
M. Scanlon, ‘Rawls on Justification’ in Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003): 159-61. 
10 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 20. 
11 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxvii, see 140. 
12 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 10. 
Citizens can affirm an overlapping consensus as reasonable without rejecting their acceptance of 
any reasonable comprehensive doctrine. 
 They create a consensus through the use of public reasons. These reasons are claims we 
may reasonably offer to others for mutual acceptance available to every citizen.13 We can 
contrast public reasons with non-public reasons.14 The latter are reasons that might be acceptable 
to some, but not all, comprehensive doctrines. For example, providing a reason to endorse or 
reject a public policy because of the view of an organized religion’s doctrine is a non-public 
reason because its acceptance requires our support for a particular religion’s authority on that 
matter – and so incompatible with other reasonable comprehensive doctrines citizens may 
endorse.15 An overlapping consensus is only possible when all citizens can reasonably accept the 
public reasons offered to justify a political conception of justice all can support notwithstanding 
their reasonable differences. Public reasons may not settle all, or almost all, political questions 
we face. However, for Rawls, they are the only reasons we have to perform this important task.16 
 An overlapping consensus built on public reasons creates a shared political conception of 
justice without setting up a new, rival comprehensive view.17 A consensus is freestanding 
because its acceptance does not entail any special commitment to any particular doctrine.18 In 
this way, Rawls claims that an overlapping consensus justifies political stability ‘for the right 
reasons’ as it respects the equality of citizens and their reasonable differences over the good.19 
 
13 See John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness’ in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001): 208. 
14 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 92 and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213, 220-22. 
15 See Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ in Law of Peoples, 169-70 and Rawls, Political Liberalism, lv-lvii. 
16 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 26-27, 91 and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 163. 
17 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxix: ‘Political liberalism is not comprehensive liberalism’. 
18 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 33, 37 and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13. 
19 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxix, xli-xliii, see 96-97, 127, 144, 226. 
 
Sen on political liberalism 
Rawls’s proposal of political liberalism as a solution to the problem of political stability in light 
of reasonable pluralism has attracted criticism. Some, such as Kurt Baier, Brian Barry and 
George Klosko, have argued that political liberalism’s overlapping consensus is unnecessary for 
securing political stability.20 They argue that there are resources in Rawls’s theory of justice – 
such as a commitment to two principles of justice – that can forge stability despite disagreements 
about the good. Others like Kent Greenawalt, Michael Sandel and Leif Wenar claim an 
overlapping consensus is too fragile to secure political stability.21 They accept that the consensus 
is an important bridge connecting citizens across their reasonable differences over the good, but 
skeptical about how strong the ties that bind them together can be. In previous work, I have 
argued that we can accept both sides: Rawls does have resources in his theory to build solidarity 
beyond what others have identified, such as reciprocity, that can strengthen the ties that an 
overlapping consensus offers.22 
 
20 See Kurt Baier, ‘Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy’, Ethics 99 (1989): 771-90; Brian Barry, ‘John Rawls 
and the Search for Stability’, Ethics 105 (1995): 874-915 and George Klosko, ‘Rawls’s Argument from Political 
Stability’, Columbia Law Review 94 (1994): 1882-97. See also Gerald Gaus, ‘A Tale of Two Sets: Public Reason in 
Equilibrium’, Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (2011): 305-25; Edward F. McClennen, ‘Justice and the Problem of 
Stability’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 3-30 and Samuel Scheffler, ‘The Appeal of Political Liberalism’, 
Ethics 105 (1994): 4-22. 
21 See Kent Greenawalt, ‘Some Problems with Public Reason in John Rawls’s Political Liberalism’, Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review 28 (1995): 1303-17; Michael Sandel, ‘Political Liberalism’, Harvard Law Review 107 (1994): 
1765-94; Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998): 184-218 and Leif Wenar, ‘Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique’, Ethics 106 (1995): 32-62. See Jon 
Garthoff, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus Revisited’, Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2012): 183-96; Chandran 
Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 1990): 149; Cynthia A. Stark, 
‘Respecting Human Dignity: Contract versus Capabilities’, Metaphilosophy 40 (2009): 366-81 and Iris Marion 
Young, ‘ Rawls’s Political Liberalism’, Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (1995): 181-90. 
22 See [anonymized] 
 One especially interesting line of criticism comes from proponents of the capabilities 
approach claiming that Rawls’s political liberalism can be improved by incorporating 
capabilities into his account. How his political liberalism might be compatible with capabilities 
will be the subject for the rest of our discussion.  
Amartya Sen argues Rawls’s list of primary goods are best understood in terms of Sen’s 
understanding of capability and so he should revise his list accordingly.23 In contrast, Rawls 
claims that citizens must be guaranteed primary goods above a social minimum. These primary 
goods are defined as ‘what persons need in their status as free and equal persons, and as normal 
and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life’.24 These goods include the 
following: 
 
A. Basic rights and liberties, also given by a list; 
B. Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse 
opportunities; 
C. Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and 
economic institutions of the basic structure; 
D. Income and wealth; and finally, 
E. The social bases of self-respect.25 
 
 
23 See Amartya Sen, ‘Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984’, Journal of Philosophy LXXXII 
(1985): 199-201. See also Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 141; Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 68 
and T. M. Scanlon, ‘Value, Desire and Quality of Life’ in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds), The Quality of 
Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 185-200, at 197-99. 
24 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xiii. 
25 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 181. 
If a state is unable to guarantee a social minimum of these primary goods, then it fails to satisfy 
the constitutional essentials of a just polity.26 This is because our capacity to understand, to apply 
and to act from – and not merely be in accordance with – the principles of political justice 
require a social minimum is achieved and makes possible what Rawls calls ‘a decent human 
life’.27 
 Sen argues that Rawls should revise this account of primary goods to remove a 
problematic ambiguity at its centre that would help clarify their role in securing individual 
freedom and well-being.28 Sen says: 
 
Some primary goods (such as “income and wealth”) are no more than means to real ends 
. . . Other primary goods (such as “the social basis of self-respect” to which Rawls makes 
an explicit reference) can include aspects of the social climate, even though they are 
generalized means (in the case of “the social basis of self-respect” means to achieving 
self-respect). Still others (such as “liberties”) can be interpreted in different ways: either 
as a means (liberties permit us to do things that we may value doing) or as the actual 
freedom to achieve certain results.29 
 
 
26 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 228-29. 
27 See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 18-19, 129. 
28 See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 56; Amartya Sen, Inequality 
Reexamined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): 33; Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Allen Lane, 
1999): 238 and Amartya Sen, ‘The Economies of Happiness and Capability’ in Luigino Bruni, Flavio Comim and 
Maurizio Pugno (eds), Capabilities and Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 16-27, at 24-25. 
29 Sen, Development as Freedom, 306-7. 
Sen’s argument is that Rawls understands primary goods too narrowly – as a means to 
satisfactory human living, but not its end.30 The problem with primary goods, for Sen, is that 
they fail to capture an important distinction between our ‘doing something’ and our ‘being free 
to do that thing’.31 
 Sen argues this problem can be solved by revising Rawls’s account of primary goods to 
become capabilities.32 Sen claims that this would ‘not be a foundational departure from Rawls’s 
own programme, but mainly an adjustment’.33 This is because, for Sen, ‘basic capabilities can be 
seen as a natural extension of Rawls’s concern with primary goods’ – and a more robust account 
of them.34 Rawls should have recognized that institutions are not always required to secure 
primary goods in some cases: understanding them as capabilities would correct this mistake.35 
 In summary, Sen claims that Rawls’s political liberalism can be compatible with 
capabilities. Sen argues that capabilities provide a more robust – and more consistent – 
understanding of primary goods within Rawls’s theory. If we revise Rawls’s account of primary 
goods, we can fit capabilities into his political liberalism and close gaps and inconsistencies in 
Rawls’s account. 
 
Nussbaum on political liberalism 
 
30 See Sen, The Idea of Justice, 234. 
31 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 234, 237. Ee Sen, ‘Well-Being, Agency and Freedom’, 198-99. 
32 See Sen, Inequality Reexamined, 87 and Sen, The Idea of Justice, 64. 
33 See Sen, The Idea of Justice, 66. 
34 Amartya Sen, Equality of What? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980): 218-19. See Sen, Development 
as Freedom, 74, 78 and Sen, The Idea of Justice, 262. 
35 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 90. 
Martha Nussbaum also argues that Rawls’s political liberalism is compatible with her own 
approach to capabilities – which is in a different way from Sen’s.36 Where Sen believes his 
capability approach can be best incorporated as an improved modification of Rawls’s primary 
goods, Nussbaum claims her capabilities approach can be a part of an overlapping consensus – 
and so her different conception of capabilities is argued to fit best in a different part of political 
liberalism. 
 Nussbaum disagrees with Sen about understanding primary goods as capabilities because 
she believes it could jeopardize the ‘desired simplicity’ that Rawls aspired to with his theory of 
justice ‘both in indexing relative social positions and in describing the point of social 
cooperation’.37 While she acknowledges that perhaps Rawls’s theory could be made more 
compelling, it would come at a cost – so Sen is incorrect to argue that Rawls should accept this 
revision even if there is good reason for him to accept it.38 
 Moreover, Nussbaum claims that if Rawls made this revision it ‘would require a major 
overhaul of the theory [of justice], particularly as a theory of economic justice’.39 For Nussbaum, 
individual decisions about conceptions of the good are left by Rawls to citizens whereas the 
capabilities approach endorses a shared, public conception of justice where the good of others is 
built into the good of each citizen.40 Furthermore, capabilities are not merely instrumental to 
 
36 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge: 
Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2006): chapters 1-3; Martha C Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: 
The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 5, 14, 59, 74-75, 105 and Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University 
Press, 2011): 19, 79, 89-93, 182. 
37 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 142. 
38 I find this criticism unconvincing because it is unclear that any rendering of capabilities – such as a list like 
Nussbaum’s – would jeopardize desired simplicity in a list like Rawls’s. This criticism may be aimed at a particular 
understanding of capability, namely, Sen’s, but does not clearly concern alternative understandings about 
capabilities. 
39 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 146. 
40 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 158. 
human dignity, but ‘as ways of realizing a life with human dignity’.41 The right and the good are 
inseparable and they ‘seem thoroughly intertwined’.42 Capabilities are ‘fundamental entitlements 
of citizens’ and all capabilities are ‘necessary for a decent and dignified human life’: ‘If people 
are below the threshold on any of the capabilities, that is a failure of basic justice, no matter how 
high they are on all the others’.43 In short, while Nussbaum recognizes the potential overlap 
between primary goods and capabilities identified by Sen, she rejects it as it largely leaves 
Rawls’s contractarianism intact whereas capabilities are ‘fundamental entitlements’ that must be 
secured. 
She argues that capabilities ‘can become the object of an overlapping consensus among 
people who otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good’.44 Nussbaum 
says: 
 
The political principles of the capabilities approach are supported by independent 
arguments about human dignity. We do not try to generate principles out of compassion 
alone, but, instead, we seek to support them and render them stable through the 




41 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 161. 
42 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 162-63. 
43 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 166-67. See Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 73 and Nussbaum, 
Creating Capabilities, 36. 
44 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 70. 
45 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 91. 
For Nussbaum, capabilities can be part of an overlapping consensus because both enjoy a 
freestanding justification and she claims capabilities are compatible with any reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine.46 While she provides a list of ten capabilities, Nussbaum is also very 
clear that the list is not ‘final’ nor set in stone: ‘if it turns out to lack something that experience 
shows to be a crucial element of a life worthy of human dignity, it can always be contested and 
remade’.47 
 In summary, Sen claims that Rawls should revise his account of primary goods to 
conform to Sen’s views of capability – Sen claims this would improve Rawls’s account and 
show how capabilities and political liberalism can be made compatible. Nussbaum claims that 
Rawls should look to capabilities as a part of any overlapping consensus and that this is the best 
space to bring capabilities and political liberalism together. She argues that capabilities can fulfil 
the function of an overlapping consensus because any reasonable comprehensive doctrine can 
connect and support with capabilities. So Sen is correct to claim capabilities and political 
liberalism are compatible, while Nussbaum claims they are compatible in a different part of 
Rawls’s theory (e.g., an overlapping consensus) than argued for by Sen (e.g., primary goods). 
They cannot both be correct. 
 
A third way 
I believe Sen and Nussbaum are both correct to argue Rawls’s political liberalism is compatible 
with capabilities, but not in the way that either Sen or Nussbaum claims. Sen is correct that 
 
46 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 79, 304-5 and Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 89-92. See Samuel Freeman, 
‘Frontiers of Justice: The Capabilities Approach vs. Contractarianism’, Texas Law Review 85 (2006): 390-91. 
47 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 15. 
capabilities are best placed as a more robust modification of primary goods, but Nussbaum’s 
understanding of capabilities are more compatible with Rawls’s theory of justice to serve as this 
modification. In short, Sen identifies where capabilities should be located and Nussbaum 
provides the better fitting view of capabilities to fulfil this role – but not vice versa.  
 To begin, Rawls considers and rejects Sen’s proposed revision, but the reason for this 
rejection is illuminating. Rawls recognizes the significant overlap across his account of primary 
goods and Sen’s account of capability. The issue is that the latter is broader, but in a problematic 
way. Rawls notes that ‘I hope that now our views are in accord on the topics that concern us 
here, though his view has more broader aims than mine’.48 Rawls says that ‘I agree with Sen that 
basic capabilities are of first importance and that the use of primary goods is always to be 
assessed in the light of assumptions about those capabilities’.49 However, Rawls argues: 
 
In reply, it should be stressed that the account of primary goods does take into account, 
and does not abstract from, basic capabilities: namely, the capabilities of citizens as free 
and equal persons in virtue of their two moral powers. It is these powers that enable them 
to be normal, and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life and to 
maintain their status as free and equal citizens . . . These remarks locate the role of 
primary goods within the framework of justice as fairness as a whole . . . we see that it 
does recognize the fundamental relation between primary goods and persons’ basic 
 
48 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 179. 
49 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 183. 
capabilities. In fact, the index of those goods is drawn up by asking what things, given 
the basic capabilities included in the (normative) conception of citizens as free an equal.50 
 
Rawls argues that ‘Sen might accept the use of primary goods, at least in many instances’: 
primary goods already incorporate some substantive connection with capabilities that does not 
require further revision.51 Primary goods have flexibility in application even if not explicitly 
open to future revision over time and changing circumstances.  
However, the difference is that primary goods are more determinate and easier to apply 
than capabilities.52 Rawls says: ‘A scientific (as opposed to a normative) measure of the full 
range of these capabilities is impossible as a matter of practice, if not theoretically as well’.53 For 
Rawls, concepts, such as ‘well-being’, are ‘not sufficiently determinate’.54 Primary goods are 
more attractive because they offer an account that speaks to some measure of well-being in a 
way that is more relevant for application to practices. Primary goods, not capabilities, satisfy the 
publicity criterion whereby claims of injustice are easily accessible and verifiable by all.55 
 This criticism of Sen’s account is much less of a problem for Nussbaum’s account of 
capabilities as it presents a list.56 So one criticism of the capabilities approach is that it is too 
imprecise and does not offer ‘workable criteria for interpersonal comparisons that can be 
 
50 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 169-70. 
51 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 170. 
52 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 185. 
53 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 171. 
54 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 283 See G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in 
Political Philosophy, ed. Michael Otsuka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011): 40-43, 47-48, 50-51. 
55 See John Rawls, ‘Social Unity and Primary Goods’ in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and 
Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 169-70 and Rawls, Law of Peoples, 13. 
56 See Freeman, ‘Frontiers of Justice’, 419-20. 
publicly and, if possible, easily applied’.57 This objection can be overcome by defending a more 
determinate account of capabilities – like Nussbaum’s – that avoids this problem. 
 For Rawls, every citizen is guaranteed a social minimum of primary goods. These include 
(a) basic rights and liberties, (b) freedom of movement and choice of occupation, (c) political 
and economic freedoms, (d) income and wealth and (e) ‘the social bases of self-respect’.58 Thus 
primary goods represent a package of essential rights and freedoms, opportunities, basic needs 
and self-respect. 
 Nussbaum’s capabilities approach captures this conception in a more robust alternative 
form. Her proposed list of ten capabilities includes Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, 
Imagination, Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play and Control 
Over One’s Environment. Neither Nussbaum’s capabilities approach nor Rawls’s social 
minimum are meant to offer a complete account of social justice – although both claim to 
provide us with an essential component for any such account of ‘minimum core social 
entitlements’.59  
Capabilities and the social minimum address the same primary goods, but capabilities 
provides more clarity – or what Nussbaum calls ‘a rather ample social minimum’.60 While both 
capture a minimum of basic rights and liberties, only the capabilities approach is explicit in its 
relationship to human rights and rights more generally.61 They each address freedom of 
 
57 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 186. See Henry S. Richardson, ’Some Limitations of Nussbaum’s Capabilities’, 
Quinnipiac Law Review 19 (2000): 309-32 and Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Reply’, Quinnipiac Law Review 19 (2000): 362-
65. 
58 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 181. 
59 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 244-45, 279 and Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 75. See [anonymized]. 
60 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 40. 
61 See Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice 78; Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 62; Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities 
and Human Rights’, Fordham Law Review 66 (1997): 273-300 and Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities, Entitlements, 
Rights: Supplementation and Critique’, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12 (2011); 23-37. 
movement and occupational choice, yet capabilities develops greater specification of their 
importance for human flourishing and related goods, such as affiliation, recreation and some 
measure of control over political and material environments. Thus capabilities – as understood 
by Nussbaum – do not merely map onto primary goods, but the former provide an extended view 
of the latter. Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is a better fit with Rawls’s list of primary goods than 
Sen’s capability approach which eschews such lists and does not focus on the need to satisfy a 
threshold minimum like Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Rawls’s social minimum of 
primary goods does. 
 The second and more crucial reason why Rawls rejects Sens’s proposed revision of the 
primary goods as capabilities is because Rawls understood capabilities as a kind of 
comprehensive doctrine. Rawls argues that political liberalism ‘presupposes no particular 
comprehensive view, and hence may be supported by an enduring overlapping consensus of 
reasonable doctrines’.62Rawls believes that primary goods have a more limited nature than 
capabilities. These goods are understood within a political conception of justice that address the 
needs of citizens and ‘not anyone’s idea of the basic values of human life and must not be so 
understood’.63 Rawls says: ‘Justice as fairness rejects the idea of comparing and maximizing 
overall well-being in matters of political justice’: primary goods should not be understood in 
terms of ‘anyone’s idea of the basic values of human life . . . however essential their 
possession’.64 Political liberalism would then best respect the fact of reasonable pluralism and 
endorse a political conception ‘that is mutually acceptable to citizens generally’.65 
 
62 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 37. 
63 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 188. 
64 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 188. 
65 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 188. 
 The problem with this objection is that it assumes without argument that the capabilities 
approach is an overly substantive view about the good that a person might reasonably reject. The 
primary goods are compatible with any reasonable comprehensive doctrine. So Rawls cannot be 
opposed to any endorsement of goods for fear that they might be incompatible with reasonable 
pluralism without denying primary goods altogether. Rawls is clear that primary goods overlap 
to some substantial degree with capabilities, such as the need to secure the guarantee of moral 
powers for each individual. Rawls appears to claim that primary goods are different from 
capabilities because they provide a sufficiently ‘thin’ conception of the good endorsable by all 
reasonable persons. Primary goods are a sufficiently thin conception because they are compatible 
with any reasonable comprehensive doctrine. But what Rawls needs to argue is not that primary 
goods are sufficiently thin, but rather that capabilities are too ‘thick’: the issue is then not 
whether capabilities are more robust than primary goods, but incompatible with any reasonable 
doctrine. If they are not, then his objection fails – and it does fail. The capabilities approach is 
not a fully comprehensive doctrine as even its leading critics accept.66  
 Rawls’s concern is directed towards a specific understanding of capability, namely, Sen’s 
approach. This is a more ‘thick’ conception than Nussbaum’s insofar as only the latter has a 
particular focus on satisfying a threshold in a manner not dissimilar to how Rawls employs 
primary goods and their social minimum. This minimum is potentially compatible for all in a 
way that a view of capability without specified thresholds does not. In this way, Nussbaum’s list 
makes a better fit with Rawls’s list without importing a full comprehensive doctrine – a risk that 
Rawls thought possible with Sen’s capability approach. 
 
66 See Thomas Pogge, ‘A Critique of the Capabilities Approach’ in Henry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns (eds), 
Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 19-20. 
 However, Nussbaum did not accept Sen’s view that capabilities are best incorporated into 
political liberalism as a revised view of primary goods, but instead as part of an overlapping 
consensus, she acknowledges the close connection between her list of capabilities and Rawls’s 
primary goods and she says her list ‘could figure as an account of primary goods’.67 But she 
could also have noted a further substantive connection between capabilities and primary goods in 
that both are understood in terms of threshold satisfaction: what matters for Nussbaum is that 
opportunities to exercise capabilities above a threshold can obtain and what matters for Rawls is 
primary goods can be enjoyed above a social minimum. As Nussbaum notes, ‘the notion of a 
threshold is more important in my account than the notion of full capability equality’.68 We look 
to ensuring we are all above a threshold as a fundamental concern of justice for every individual 
without trade-offs between capabilities – and likewise between primary goods. For these reasons, 
Nussbaum’s account of capabilities seems the better fit despite her reservations about revising 
Rawls’s primary goods in terms of capabilities. 
 Nussbaum’s argument for understanding capabilities as part of an overlapping consensus 
is problematic – and because of the specific content she builds into her capabilities. For example, 
the capability of Bodily Integrity includes a right to ‘choice in matters of reproduction’.69 If her 
capabilities approach is to be a part of an overlapping consensus, then it must be acceptable to 
any reasonable comprehensive doctrine – and these doctrines include all major world faiths.70 
The problem here is not that Bodily Integrity is a capability, but that Bodily Integrity is given 
with the specific content of providing for a right to reproductive choice. This is because not all 
 
67 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 116. See Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 5, 74-75. 
68 See Nussbaum, Women and Human development, 12. 
69 Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 41. 
70 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 59. 
major world religions – Roman Catholicism as only one of several examples – would accept this 
right upfront. It is possible through the use of public reasons to make the argument for 
reproductive choice in a way that Catholics could access – perhaps even on grounds of Bodily 
Integrity – even if most, it not all, did not find these reasons compelling. The possibility of 
Catholicism does not rule out the community’s acceptance of reproductive rights, but any 
acceptance will need to be achieved through public reasons and not assumed – or given – 
through a foundation built on an overlapping consensus with parts prima facie objectionable to 
Catholics. Nussbaum’s problem is easily avoided by not so narrowing construing this capability 
in a way that cannot be accepted by every reasonable comprehensive doctrine. 
 There are also more controversial issues regarding other capabilities. Another capability 
on Nussbaum’s list is Play which provides individuals with a minimum right ‘to enjoy 
recreational activities’.71 All citizens are guaranteed at least a minimum to ensure each has a 
minimally decent life. However, not all major world religions accept leisure as a good – 
including the Puritans who helped found America.72 They may be wrong about the importance of 
play, but this is to be weighed up – in Rawls’s political liberalism – through the interplay of 
public reason and not a given upfront.  
 In summary, Nussbaum’s capabilities are provided with content that may clash with 
central tenets of the major world religions included in Rawls’s list of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. It is clear that each can have their objections to policies over reproductive choice or 
leisure activities through the interplay of public reason. However, the content of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities seems to close off this conversation before it begins. Perhaps if left more ‘thin’ and 
 
71 Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, 41-42. 
72 I am grateful to Derek Matravers for raising this objection to me. 
specified more minimally there would be less concern. As stated, the content of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities does not make obvious their being automatically a part of any reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine. So while the list provides a more robust list of primary goods that we 
might accept in an original position, her list seems too thick to be accepted as an overlapping 
consensus by individuals from any comprehensive doctrine. Nussbaum is correct that capabilities 
can be compatible with Rawls’s political liberalism and she offers an account that can achieve 
this result, but not where she thought (e.g., overlapping consensus) but instead somewhere else 
(e.g., primary goods). 
 
Conclusion 
This essay has explored the relationship between capabilities and political liberalism. Both 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum argue that their different views on capabilities are 
compatible with political liberalism in different places. Sen claims capabilities should be seen as 
a revision of primary goods while Nussbaum argues capabilities should form part of an 
overlapping consensus. 
 I have argued that they are both right – and incorrect. Sen correctly identifies where 
capabilities and political liberalism are most compatible. While Rawls raises objections 
specifically about how Sen’s capability approach is too ‘thick’ and closer to a comprehensive 
doctrine, these objections can be met by Nussbaum’s capabilities approach which is more ‘thin’, 
uses a list, focuses on meeting a minimum threshold and so a more ready fit with Rawls’s list of 
primary goods. So Sen is correct about where to find compatibility, but it is Nussbaum who has 
the capabilities approach that is the most compatible at that specific point. 
 Nussbaum argues compatibility between capabilities and political liberalism is best found 
in an overlapping consensus. However, I have argued that the content of her capabilities is 
problematic as it includes a core that clashes with the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 
should be able to accept it. This is not to say that Nussbaum is mistaken to argue for a right to 
reproductive choice or for leisure. But it is to say that, on Rawls’s account, such content is 
problematic for prioritizing some doctrines over others. While Nussbaum is correct that 
capabilities and political liberalism are compatible, I do not agree this is found in the location she 
identifies. 
 This essay has not considered the merits of bringing capabilities and political liberalism, 
such as how political stability might be better secured over time as I have argued elsewhere.73 It 
is clear that capabilities and political liberalism need not be viewed as rivals, but can be brought 
together  except only not how or where Sen and Nussbaum thought– using Nussbaum’s list in 
where Sen identified compatibility in Rawls’s primary goods. Thus we need to look for a third 
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